Saša Čekrlija is a full professor in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, and a guest professor in the People’s Republic of China, where he has spent considerable time observing how long-term planning and infrastructure connectivity reshape economic geography. He holds a PhD in human sustainable development, and his research bridges tourism, environmental management, rural development and agrotourism with the harder questions of governance: whether development actually improves people’s lives, or merely builds roads and institutions while villages empty of their young.
From 2015 to 2019, he served as an advisor to Igor Crnadak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving him a direct view of the country’s efforts to navigate between its European integration path and the growing economic opportunities presented by China. Based in Banja Luka, he writes and teaches on foreign policy strategy, constitutional governance, and what he terms “human sustainable development”—the idea that no investment, however large, can be called sustainable if citizens cannot find decent work, access quality education, or see a future for themselves in their own communities.
In this interview, Čekrlija discusses the opportunities and risks of Chinese investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the challenge of aligning visa policy and infrastructure projects with EU standards, and how Sarajevo can turn its position between Brussels and Beijing into a genuine strategic advantage rather than a source of political friction.
You have described “human sustainable development” as central to your academic work. In the context of post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, where do you see the biggest gap between the theory of sustainable development and what is actually happening on the ground in rural communities?
The biggest gap lies in the fact that we still tend to understand sustainable development as the development of infrastructure, projects and institutions, rather than as the development of people and communities. This is one of the central questions of my academic work. One of my early papers addressing this issue was entitled “Can We Become a Happier Society?” My research on sustainable development, tourism, environmental management, rural development and, more recently, agrotourism, which I also conduct with my students, is grounded in what we call the concept of human sustainable development. Sustainable development has long been an established concept, but I believe that adding the prefix “human” gives it an entirely new dimension. For me, development is sustainable only when it improves people’s actual quality of life while, at the same time, preserving the resources on which future generations will depend. In rural Bosnia and Herzegovina, this gap is particularly visible. We can invest in roads, tourism infrastructure, agricultural programmes or environmental protection projects, while villages continue to lose their younger populations. This demonstrates that economic activity alone is not sufficient. If people cannot find decent employment, do not have access to quality education and healthcare, cannot establish families and do not see a future for themselves in their communities, it is difficult to describe such development as sustainable. There is also a significant gap between public strategies and what is actually happening at the local level. Too many development policies are designed from the top down, while rural communities are often treated merely as beneficiaries of development projects rather than as active participants in defining their own future. I believe we need to move away from a project-based understanding of development towards a model that places people at its centre. Agriculture, tourism, environmental protection, education, digitalisation, infrastructure and local entrepreneurship should not be treated as separate policy areas. They need to form part of an integrated development strategy.
For me, the ultimate test is very simple: can a young person living in a rural community see a meaningful future there? When young people in these areas are satisfied with their quality of life and see opportunities for themselves within their communities, then we can say that we have succeeded in putting the “human” dimension first. If the answer is no, then we may have economic growth or individual development projects, but without a genuinely human approach, we risk creating areas without people and, consequently, without a future. If the demographic space continues to shrink, development cannot be truly sustainable.
Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina still functions as a single state in any meaningful administrative or political sense, or has it effectively become a confederation of two entities operating under a shared facade?
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the reality in which we live. However, the question is to what extent it functions today as a unified political and administrative system. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own institutions, international legal personality, internationally recognised borders, membership in international organisations and a unified international legal identity. For that reason, I would not describe it as a confederation. A confederation would imply a different constitutional relationship between its constituent members. At the same time, however, we cannot ignore the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system is highly decentralised and that the entities have very strong political, institutional and administrative autonomy. This is part of the reality of the Dayton constitutional system. I believe the real problem is that Bosnia and Herzegovina often fails to distinguish between decentralisation and political obstruction. Decentralisation in itself is not a problem. The problem arises when different levels of government spend more energy proving their political superiority over one another than on solving the problems faced by citizens. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state composed of different levels of government, but these levels must be capable of functioning together. More than eighty percent of competencies are at the level of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only certain competencies are exercised at the state level, and I believe that this distribution is more than sufficient to ensure that no one should feel threatened. There are issues that no entity, canton or local community can address on its own: European integration, foreign relations, security, migration, counter-terrorism, natural disasters and many other challenges. Therefore, I do not believe the solution lies either in abolishing the entities or in attempting to create a highly centralised state that would disregard the realities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I see the solution in a functional state in which different levels of government clearly understand their respective responsibilities, while also recognising that their responsibility towards citizens does not end at an administrative boundary. For me, what matters more is how the system functions than how we label the constitutionally defined relationships. Some people are satisfied with them, while others are not. Everyone expected more for themselves and less for the other side. That is why I believe the Dayton Peace Agreement provides an excellent framework within which this country can function. There is no winner and no one has any reason to feel defeated. If a citizen can receive quality public services, find employment, educate their children, start a business and plan for the future, then institutions have a purpose. If institutions exist merely to demonstrate who has jurisdiction, while citizens gain nothing from them, then we have a serious problem of functionality. To conclude, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a confederation of two entities, but it is a state with three levels of government and a highly fragmented system of governance. Our task is not to deny this complexity, but to learn how to turn it into a functional system. Belgium and Switzerland are no less complex in terms of their constitutional arrangements, but their systems are organised in a way that enables them to make the most of their existing constitutional frameworks for the benefit of their citizens, rather than producing deadlock, uncertainty and poverty.
You have spent considerable time in China as a guest professor and have written extensively on China-BiH relations. What aspects of China’s approach to development do you find applicable to the Western Balkans, and what should Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly avoid replicating?
When we talk about China and its development model, I believe the most important thing is not to try to copy the Chinese system, but to understand what has led to particular results and what aspects of that experience can be adapted to our own circumstances. China has taught me, above all, how important long-term planning, continuity of development policies and the ability to turn an idea into a concrete project are for development. During my time in China, I had the opportunity to see how development is not viewed simply through the lens of a single project or political mandate, but through long-term objectives implemented over years and decades. I believe this is precisely something the Western Balkans can learn a great deal from China. We often view development through the lens of one political mandate, one project or one source of funding. What we lack is continuity. Every new political structure often feels the need to start from scratch rather than build on what has already been done well. Another important lesson concerns infrastructure and connectivity. China has demonstrated that infrastructure is not merely a construction project. A motorway, railway, port, airport or digital infrastructure can transform the economic geography of an entire region. For the small countries and markets of the Western Balkans, regional connectivity is particularly important. We can also learn from China’s approach to education, technology and the development of human capital. China has combined massive investment in development with education, science, technology and the creation of new economic sectors. Without people who are capable of using new technologies, infrastructure alone will not generate development. However, there are also things that Bosnia and Herzegovina should explicitly avoid copying. Above all, we should not uncritically replicate China’s approach to large-scale development projects. A large project is not automatically a good project. Every investment must be assessed in terms of its economic viability, public interest, environmental impact and long-term sustainability, and, of course, through the lens of human sustainable development.
Western sanctions against Republica Srpska leadership have been expanding for years. In your assessment, are these sanctions altering the political calculus in Banja Luka, or have they simply hardened the entity’s orientation toward non-Western partners?
I believe that the sanctions have certainly had an effect, but I am not convinced that they have produced the political outcome their architects expected. If we look at the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly in Republic of Srpska, we do not see that sanctions have led to a fundamental change in the political course. On the contrary, to a significant extent they have reinforced the perception that the West approaches Republic of Srpska not as a partner, but primarily through political pressure. Following the lifting of sanctions on the leadership of Republic of Srpska, the United States is increasingly perceived as a strategic partner, while Brussels and the European Union are viewed by many as adversarial and as representing a retrograde force whose project of European unity will ultimately fail. This is particularly important in a society that already has a strong historical distrust of certain Western policies. When sanctions are imposed on political leaders, their consequences do not always remain limited to the individuals they formally target. They can have negative effects on citizens and, in particular, on economic activity. I would therefore say that sanctions can have a dual effect. On the one hand, they may constrain the financial and political activities of individuals and institutions. On the other hand, they can further strengthen political rhetoric and encourage a turn towards alternative international partners, particularly China and Russia. That is why I believe it is important to ask what the actual objective of sanctions is. If the objective is to change the behaviour of political leadership, then we need to assess whether that behaviour is genuinely changing. If it is not, while distrust towards the West is simultaneously increasing, then we have to acknowledge that the instrument may not be producing the intended result.
I do not believe that any political leader should be above accountability. If there are concrete violations of the law, institutions should respond accordingly. But sanctions cannot, in themselves, be a substitute for a political process. In the long term, I believe it is far more effective to combine pressure with dialogue and a credible political path towards a solution. If you close all the doors to someone, you cannot be surprised when they begin looking for other doors. Republika Srpska cannot, and should not, be isolated from the West. Its economy, citizens, companies and institutions are deeply connected to the European Union. At the same time, Republika Srpska has the right to develop relations with China, Russia and other international partners. That is why I would like to see international policy towards all actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina become less focused on punishment and more focused on creating incentives for cooperation. I believe sanctions can change the behaviour of an individual, but they are much less likely to change the political perception of an entire society.
You have argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina must carefully balance its relations between China and the European Union. With Brussels now pressuring BiH to align its visa policy with EU standards, is that dual approach becoming politically unsustainable?
I do not believe that balancing relations with China and the European Union is inherently unsustainable. I believe the problem is that Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks a sufficiently clear strategy for turning this balance into its own advantage. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a European country, and the European Union is its most important political, economic and institutional framework. This is not simply a matter of political choice. Our economy, labour market, trade, investment and the everyday lives of a large number of our citizens are already deeply connected to the European Union. But this does not mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina should cut its relations with other major global partners. China is a global economic power and an important partner in areas such as infrastructure, technology, trade, education and investment. I believe it would be wrong to expect Bosnia and Herzegovina to sever other relationships simply because of its European path. However, there is an important boundary. If we want membership in the European Union, we must also be prepared to accept the rules that arise from that process. We cannot seek access to European funds, the European market, freedom of movement and the prospect of membership, while at the same time expecting to pursue entirely independent policies in areas directly connected to the European security and migration systems. That is why I would not view the issue of visa policy simply as a question of our relations with China. Above all, it is a question of our European integration and of aligning with the rules we have accepted as part of that process. At the same time, I believe it is important that Bosnia and Herzegovina should not simply be a country that accepts decisions made by others. We must know what we want and what we gain in return. If we align our visa policy with the European Union, then we should simultaneously be discussing what European integration will bring to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how it can facilitate trade, mobility, education, investment and access to the European market. In other words, European integration should not be merely a process of aligning regulations. It must be a development project. That is why I would not frame this as a choice between China and the European Union. I would speak instead about different interests and different types of relationships. With the European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina is building the political and institutional framework of its future. With China, it should develop economic, educational, technological and other forms of cooperation wherever there is a genuine mutual interest.
The Office of the High Representative continues to impose decisions using the Bonn Powers. Do you believe this role has become an obstacle to genuine domestic ownership of the political process, or is it still a necessary guarantor of the peace?
I believe it is important here to distinguish between two things: the role of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and the High Representative as a guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement, on the one hand, and the use of the Bonn Powers to directly intervene in the domestic political process, on the other. The Office of the High Representative was established at a completely different historical moment. Bosnia and Herzegovina was emerging directly from war, institutions were weak, political trust was almost non-existent, and the international community needed a mechanism to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, more than three decades have now passed. If, after all this time, an international representative still has to make decisions on behalf of domestic institutions, then we must ask ourselves what we, as a society and political system, have actually managed to build in the meantime. I do not believe the problem lies in the existence of an international role. The problem arises when international intervention begins to replace domestic political responsibility. It is not normal for someone in Europe to have the power to suspend the Constitution of a sovereign country for 24 hours. This has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If that can happen, then we have to ask ourselves whether we can genuinely describe ourselves as a fully sovereign state. If someone has the authority to suspend the Constitution and unilaterally impose decisions, then it is reasonable to expect that the same authority should also assume responsibility for the consequences of those decisions. Yet we have not seen such accountability for any of the hundreds of decisions that have been imposed. If domestic politicians know that, whenever they fail to reach an agreement, someone else will eventually make the decision for them, then the incentive to seek compromise themselves becomes weaker. And compromise is precisely what Bosnia and Herzegovina needs most. That is why I do not believe the Bonn Powers should be regarded as a normal instrument of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were a product of a particular historical period and should become less necessary as domestic institutions grow stronger. At the same time, I do not think it would be responsible simply to say: “The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be closed.” We all know the conditions that have been established for the closure of the OHR, commonly referred to as the “5+2” agenda. That is why I believe the Council of Ministers in the 2025–2029 mandate should treat this issue as a priority and seriously consider the steps required to fulfil those conditions. Such a decision must be based on an assessment of the political and security situation, but above all on a process through which domestic institutions gradually assume full responsibility for the functioning of the country. For me, the real success of the international community would be for the day to come when it is no longer needed to resolve our internal political problems. Not because the international community has done a poor job, but precisely because it has helped build a system capable of functioning independently. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot remain a project of the international community forever. It must become the responsibility of its citizens and its institutions. Therefore, I would say that the OHR can still have a role in preserving peace and the Dayton framework, but the long-term solution is not for the international representative to have ever greater powers. The long-term solution is for domestic institutions to develop sufficient political maturity, responsibility and mutual trust so that such powers are no longer necessary.
I do not believe that balancing relations with China and the European Union is inherently unsustainable. I believe the problem is that Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks a sufficiently clear strategy for turning this balance into its own advantage
You are based in Banja Luka and observe Republika Srpska politics closely. How do you interpret the current trajectory of secessionist rhetoric and the confrontation with the international community is this a genuine existential challenge to Dayton, or primarily a bargaining strategy?
I believe it would be wrong to interpret every such statement as an immediate preparation for secession. Republika Srpska has a strong sense of political and constitutional autonomy rooted in the Dayton Peace Agreement. When there is talk in Banja Luka about the “original Dayton,” this is not simply a matter of political rhetoric. It also reflects dissatisfaction with the way relations between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have evolved over the past decades. We must also recognise that secessionist rhetoric has a political function. It is often part of a broader negotiating strategy. When a political actor wants to change an existing balance of power or encourage the other side and international actors to take its demands more seriously, raising the stakes can be one way of doing so. But there is a point beyond which political rhetoric ceases to be merely a negotiating instrument. That is why I do not believe the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in one political vision defeating another. The solution is neither greater centralisation that would take powers away from the entities, nor a policy that would continually challenge the existence and stability of the state. I believe that many of these dilemmas could ultimately be overcome through European integration. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes part of the European Union, many of the questions that today appear existential could be transformed into questions of institutional competence and practical governance within a common European framework. I spoke about this in an interview with your magazine on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
How can Bosnia and Herzegovina move toward a politics of the future rather than a politics of the past?
I believe that, above all, we need to change the questions we ask ourselves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For too long, our politics has been primarily concerned with questions of the past: who is to blame, who lost more, who owes what to whom, whose historical arguments are stronger, and who represents a greater threat to the others. Of course, we cannot erase the past, and it must remain part of our political and social understanding. But we cannot allow the past to become the sole substance of our politics. If we want a politics of the future, we need to start asking different questions: how do we keep young people here, how do we develop our rural areas and cities, how do we create new jobs, how do we improve education, healthcare and public services, how do we protect our natural resources, and how do we enable people to earn a decent living from their work? This is, after all, directly connected to my concept of human sustainable development. For me, the success of a political system is not measured only by the number of laws adopted, the size of the budget or the political strength of institutions. It is measured by whether people can live with dignity, work, plan for the future and believe that their children will have better living conditions. I believe that what we particularly lack today is long-term thinking. A political cycle lasts four years, while the development of a society takes generations. If we adapt every policy to the next election, we will never create a serious development strategy. That is why we need politics that addresses demographics, education, technology, the economy, energy, environmental protection, digitalisation and regional connectivity. These are not “non-political” issues. They are the most important political questions of the future. I would particularly emphasise young people. If we are using most of the energy of our young people simply to figure out how to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, then we have to admit that our development model has failed. Young people must not only be beneficiaries of development policies; they must also be their creators and active participants. And increasingly, we recognise that their active participation must be connected with economic empowerment, the green and digital transitions, and social cohesion. There is one more thing I consider particularly important: a politics of the future does not mean forgetting the past. It means learning from the past without allowing it to govern our lives. Bosnia and Herzegovina has enough history. What it lacks today is a vision. If we can redirect the political energy that we currently spend on mutual confrontation towards development, education, employment, demographics and quality of life, then we will have made a genuine transition from a politics of the past to a politics of the future.
If you were asked to brief the next Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina for one hour on the country’s strategic priorities, what would be the three points you would insist they remember above all else?
I would insist on two things. First, that without an internal political agreement, there can be no serious and functional foreign policy; and second, that Bosnia and Herzegovina must know what its own interests are, and that foreign policy must serve development. We need to reach an internal political agreement on how we want Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct its foreign policy. This is particularly important because Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have a Law on Foreign Affairs. I consider the adoption of such a law to be one of the key prerequisites for a serious, responsible and predictable foreign policy. Such a law would have to clearly define who formulates foreign policy, who implements it, who is responsible for it, and how coordination is carried out between the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic and consular network, ambassadors and other institutions. Without clear rules, there will always be room for different interpretations and for individual officials to act according to the interests of their political party or particular interest group rather than representing an agreed position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am not referring only to ambassadors. If we do not have a clearly defined system of responsibility and coordination, different institutions and individuals can send different messages about the same country, the same international issue or the same strategic interest. This directly undermines the credibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why I believe we need a serious internal political agreement before we even adopt the law. We cannot create a good Law on Foreign Affairs unless we first agree on the basic principles of our foreign policy. Such an agreement does not mean that we all have to think alike. It means that we need to establish rules that will apply regardless of who is currently a member of the Presidency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, an ambassador or any other office-holder. The second point I would emphasise is that Bosnia and Herzegovina must have a clearly defined strategic national interest. We cannot build our foreign policy by looking at every international development through the question of whom we belong to — the West, the East, the European Union, China, Russia or anyone else. Our policy must begin with the question of what is best for Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens. The European Union is our strategic priority, but that does not mean that we should close the door to other partners. We must be capable of developing different partnerships while protecting our own interests. Foreign policy must also be much more closely connected to development. A diplomat today should not be someone who only discusses political relations. A diplomat should know how to open markets for domestic companies, attract investment, connect universities and researchers, bring in new technologies, promote tourism and create opportunities for young people. If we return to my concept of human sustainable development, then diplomacy must be one of the instruments of that development. We do not need a foreign policy that exists for its own sake. We need a foreign policy that ultimately delivers tangible benefits to citizens.
Considering that music is a very important part of your life, which song or songs could best capture what you have been talking about?
That’s a difficult question. Off the top of my head, I would say Sam Cooke’s “A Change Is Gonna Come” or John Lennon’s “Imagine.”
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